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This paper provides a bird-eye overview of the history of spatial economic theory. It is organized around 
three main ideas (and authors): (i) land use and urban economics (Thünen), (ii) the nature of competition 
across  space  (Hotelling),  and  (iii)  new  economic  geography  and  the  emergence  of  economic 
agglomerations (Krugman). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Geographical economics aims to explain why economic activities choose to establish themselves in 
some  particular  places.
1 T h e  m o s t  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  s p a c e -economy  being  the  existence  of 
economic  agglomerations  producing  and  trading  large v o l u m e s  o f  g o o d s ,  the  ultimate  goal  of 
geographical economics is to explain the riddle of uneven spatial development.  
 
Ever since the emergence of civilization, human activities and standards of living have been unevenly 
distributed among both the continents and their territories (Braudel, 1979). Just as matter in the solar 
system is concentrated in a small number of bodies (the planets and their satellites), economic life is 
concentrated in a fairly limited number of human settlements (cities and clusters), which are gathered 
under the heading of “economic agglomerations.” Furthermore, paralleling large and small planets, 
there are large and small agglomerations with very different combinations of firms and households.  
 
Although  using  economic  agglomeration  as  a  generic  term  is  convenient  at  a  certain  level  of 
abstraction, it must be kept in mind that this concept refers to very distinct real world situations. At 
one extreme of the spectrum lies the North-South divide. At the other, agglomeration arises when 
restaurants,  movie  theaters,  or  shops  selling  similar  products  are  clustered  within  the  same 
neighborhood, not to say on the same street. What distinguishes those various types of agglomeration 
is the spatial scale, or the spatial unit of reference, chosen in conducting one’s research, very much as 
there are different levels of aggregation of economic agents. Despite many differences in details, some 
major principles hold true whatever the scale of analysis retained. In particular, the emergence of 
economic agglomerations is associated with the emergence of inequalities across locations, which 
often implies that some places do better than others. 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  bird-eye  overview  of  the  main  contributions  made  by 
economists and regional scientists in understanding how the space-economy is organized.
2 There is a 
wide  agreement  that  the  space-economy  may  be  viewed  as  the  outcome  of  a  trade-off  between 
different  types  of  scale  economies  in  production  and  the  mobility  costs  of  goods,  people  and 
information. Although it has been rediscovered many times (including in recent periods), this trade-off 
is at the heart of geographical economics ever since the work of Lösch (1940-[1954]). It implies that 
the location of economic activities is the result of a complicated balance of forces that push and pull 
consumers and firms in opposing directions. Yet, it was not until Krugman (1991a) that this idea 
became widely spread within the economics profession.  
 
I  want  to  stress  from  the  outset  the  influence  of  three  major  scientists  who  epitomize  the  main 
questions  raised  in  geographical  economics:  Johann  Heinrich  von  Thünen  (1783-1850),  Harold 
Hotelling (1885-1973) and Paul Krugman (1953-). Their contributions have paved the way to large 
flows of high-quality research. Thünen (1826-[1966]) is the founding father of land use theory and his 
work as served as the corner-stone for the development of modern urban economics. Hotelling (1929) 
deals with a very different but equally fundamental issue, namely the nature of competition across 
space and the way firms choose their location in a strategic environment. Last, Krugman (1991b) has 
highlighted the microeconomic underpinnings of both spatial economic agglomerations and regional 
imbalances at national and international levels. He has achieved that by building a full-fledged general 
equilibrium  model,  which  is  able  to  explain  why,  how  and  when  the  economic  activity  may  be 
agglomerated in a few places. 
  
                                                 
1 In this paper, I have chosen to focus on geographical economics and not on economic geography proper. This does not 
reflect any prejudice on my part. Quite the opposite, I believe that economists should pay more attention to the work of 
geographers. See Garretseen and Martin (2010) for a comparative discussion of the two fields. 
2 The reader is referred to Ponsard (1983) for a detailed presentation of “who did what” in location theory from the beginning 
of the nineteenth century till the 1970s. Henry George is ignored by Ponsard despite his deep contribution to urban 
economics and local public finances; see Laurent (2005) for a discussion of this author.     3 
Ironically e n o u g h ,  none  of  those  three  authors  is  a  “spatial  economist”  per  se.  They  turned  their 
attention to spatial issues for reasons that are not directly related to the location of economic activities. 
Thünen was interested in the allocation of resources and the determination of prices. He emphasized 
space because land was an essential production factor in the main sector of his time. Hotelling aimed 
to build a theory of product selection by oligopolistic firms. To achieve his goal, he used space as a 
metaphor. As for Krugman, he was mainly interested in the interplay between increasing returns and 
imperfect competition in globalizing markets, commodity trade and production factor mobility being 
the two fundamental ingredients.  
 
To make my point stronger, I would like to stress the fact that Hotelling did not cite Thünen, while 
Krugman does not seem to be aware of the power Hotelling’s spatial metaphor and cited Thünen in his 
late and joint work with Masahisa Fujita only. Despite of this, the contributions of those three pioneers 
is so important that their impact on geographical economics has been, and will remain, deep and 
enduring.  The  existence  of  a  long-lasting  patchwork  of  results  in  economic  geography  is  also 
illustrated by the fact that the main piece of work explaining the inability of the standard paradigm of 
economic  theory,  which  combines  perfect  competition  and  constant  returns  to  scale,  to  deal  with 
spatial issues is due to another outsider, namely Starrett (1978) whose contribution will be discussed 
below.  
   
A  warning  is  in  order h e r e .  Even  though  Krugman  gave  new  life  to  the  field  of  geographical 
economics, many ideas and concepts have been around for a long time.
3 However, they were fairly 
disparate and in search of a synthesis ranging from the small to the large, which Fujita and Thisse 
(2002) have endeavored to develop. To a large extent, the history of geographical economics may be 
viewed as a process that has gradually unified various bodies of knowledge, as shown by the different 
names given to the field (regional and urban economics, location theory, and spatial economics), 
within a theoretical framework in which the focus has shifted from perfect competition to imperfect 
competition and various types of market failures. In what follows, I will only discuss the fundamental 
contributions made in geographical economics through the lenses of modern economic theory. This 
choice will lead me to put aside a wide range of contributions that have not passed the test of time. It is 
fair to say, however, that some of them - think of Weber (1909-[1929]), Fetter (1924) or Predöhl 
(1928) - have contributed to the field through the impact they had on several different scholars.
4  
 
Before proceeding, I want to stress two points. First, apart from a few papers published in the last 
volume of the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, I have chosen to discuss contributions 
that are at least 10 years old. Although the field of geographical economics is experiencing something 
that can be viewed like a boom, the dust is not settled yet. Second, the topics covered in this paper 
reflect my idiosyncrasies. I owe my apologies to those who have contributed to the field but who 
might  dislike  my c h o i c e  o f  m e n u .   That  said,  the  organization  of  the  paper r e f lects t h e  a b o v e  
methodological choices. It contains three major sections which focus on the above-mentioned issues. 
The last section concludes. 
 
2. Thünen and land use theory 
 
2.1 The location of agricultural activities 
 
                                                 
3 Earlier contributions, such as Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985) and Fujita (1988), have not reached the level of visibility and 
interest achieved by new economic geography. 
4 Including Weber in such a list may come as a surprise to some readers. Actually, Weber’s model of total transport cost 
minimization had already been studied by Launhardt (1882), whereas the rest of his analysis has added very little to our 
understanding of the existence of industrial clusters. Unpurposely, Weber’s model has served as the foundation for the 
development of facility location analysis. This body of research has been developed in regional science and operations 
research; its aim is to find optimization methods permitting to determine the optimal location pattern in a wide range of real-
world settings (Hansen et al., 1987; Wesolowsky, 1993).     4 
(a) Thünen (1826-[1966]) sought to explain the pattern of agricultural activities surrounding cities in 
preindustrial  Germany.  Each  location  in  space  is  characterized  by  various  factors  such  as  soil 
conditions, relief, geographical position, and the like. Both land rent and land use vary across locations 
depending  on  these  characteristics.  Among  them,  the  most  important  for  location  theorists  is  the 
transport-cost differential over space. Whereas Ricardo concentrated on fertility differences in his 
explanation of the land rent, Thünen constructed a theory focusing on the transport-cost differentials 
across locations. To this end, he used a very simple and elegant setting in which space is represented 
by  a  plain  on  which  land  is  homogeneous  in  all  respects  except  for  a  market  town  in  which  all 
transactions regarding agricultural goods must occur. The location of the market town is supposed to 
be given and the reasons for its existence are left outside of the analysis. By allocating an acre of land 
near the town to some crop, the costs of delivering all other crops are indirectly affected as they are 
forced to be grown farther away. Hence, determining which crops to grow where is not an easy task. 
Though simple, this setting is rich enough to show how a competitive land market can structure the 
use of land across space by perfectly divisible activities.  
  
The principles underlying his model are so general that Thünen can be considered the founder of 
marginalism (Samuelson, 1983). In addition, the importance of Thünen's analysis for the development 
of  location  theory  is  twofold  in  that  space  is  considered  as  both  an  economic  good  and  as  the 
substratum for economic activities. In his framework, the allocation of land to the different economic 
activities is shown to emerge as the equilibrium outcome of a perfectly competitive land market. The 
assumption  of  a  competitive l a n d  m a r k e t  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  l a n d  i n  a  s m a l l  
neighborhood of any location belonging to a continuous space is highly substitutable, thus making the 
competitive process for land very fierce. Very ingeniously, Thünen imagined a process in which each 
farmer makes an offer based on the surplus he can generate by using one unit of land available at any 
particular location. This has led him and his successors to develop the concept of bid rent function, 
which describes the maximum price an agent is willing to pay to occupy each location.  
 
This approach is probably what makes Thünen’s analysis of land use so original. In a sense, it rests on 
the idea that land at a particular location corresponds to a single commodity whose price cannot be 
obtained by the textbook interplay between a large number of sellers and buyers. Specifically, land at 
any point is allocated to an activity according to a bidding process in which the producer offering the 
highest bid secures the corresponding lot. A farmer’s bid depends on the transportability of his output 
and the amount of land needed to produce one unit of the good. Land being allocated to the highest 
bidder, economic activities are distributed according to the famous pattern of concentric rings, each of 
them being specialized in one crop. The land rent decreases with distance from the market town at a 
rate which is constant in each ring and decreasing from one ring to the next.   
 
(b) The model can be closed by assuming that all agricultural activities use land and labor while a 
manufactured  good  is  produced  in  town  by  using  labor  alone,  typically  under  the  form  of 
craftsmanship. Such a specialization of tasks reflects the traditional division of labor between cities 
and the countryside. Workers are perfectly mobile and landlords reside in town; they all have identical 
preferences. The solution to such a general spatial equilibrium model, in which the real wage common 
to all workers as well as the prices of agricultural and manufactured goods are endogenous, has been 
obtained by Samuelson (1983).  
 
Yet, despite his monumental contribution to economic thought, Thünen's ideas languished for several 
decades. For Blaug (1985, p.615), “The Isolated State is so tortuously constructed that its central 
message is difficult to discern.” One had to wait for Launhardt (1885, ch.30) to have a clear and 
formal treatment of Thünen’s ideas in the special case of two crops. The first model with coping n 
crops is due to Dunn (1954), while Schweizer and Varaiya (1976) have provided the complete solution 
to the general model with a Leontief technology in which goods may be used both in the final and 
intermediate sectors. Whatever their use, goods are either shipped toward the marketplace or used 
locally. We had to wait for Beckmann (1972a) for Thünen’s model to be extended to a neoclassical 
production function.   5 
 
It took even more time to explain how and when a market town, which imports agricultural goods 
from and exports manufactured goods to its rural hinterland, may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. 
More precisely, the key-question that has been at the heart of geographical economics for decades may 
be stated as follows: what binds together manufacturing firms and workers within the city? Using the 
new  economic  geography  framework  discussed  in  Section  4,  Fujita  and  Krugman  (1995)  have 
identified sufficient conditions for a monocentric economy to emerge as an equilibrium outcome. 
Specifically,  when  (1)  the  transport  cost  of  the  agricultural  good  is  low  relative  to  that  of  the 
manufactured good and (2) when the total population is small enough, all manufacturing firms, which 
operate  under  increasing  returns,  agglomerate  within  a  single  district  together  with  their w o r k e r s ,  
while farmers are dispersed across the agricultural hinterland. When one of these two conditions does 
not hold, shipping produces from and to a single market town is so costly that several cities emerge 
and generate an urban system. 
 
2.2 Urban economics 
 
(a) Urban economics holds that proximity to some specific places is the reason for such high land 
rents. As Lucas (1988, p. 39) neatly put it, “what can people be paying Manhattan or downtown 
Chicago rents for, if not for being near other people?” How to explain otherwise that, in developed and 
emerging countries, the share of housing costs keeps rising in consumers' expenditures for reasons 
which are not all related to the quality of dwellings? In most habitable regions of the globe, the supply 
of land vastly exceeds the demand for land. Therefore, absent proximity considerations, land would be 
a free good.  
 
In his doctoral dissertation, Alonso (1964) succeeded in extending Thünen’s central concept of bid 
rent curves to an urban context in which a marketplace is replaced by a Central Business District 
(CBD). In this context, the only spatial characteristic of a location is its distance from the city center, 
while the land available for raising crops is now used for housing, plants, offices, and infrastructure. 
The main objective of urban economics is to explain the internal structure of cities, that is, how land is 
distributed among various activities and why cities have one or several CBDs. The basic concept of 
urban economics is the land market, which serves to allocate both economic agents and activities 
across  space.  Alonso  (1964) a n d  Mills  (1967)  may  be  considered  as  the  founders  of  this  field. 
Treading in these authors’ footsteps, several economists and regional scientists have developed the 
model of the monocentric city. The main focus is on the households' trade-off between housing size 
and  the  accessibility  to  employment c e n t e r s,  typically  the  CBD. E v e r  s i n c e  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  u r b a n  
economics has advanced rapidly. The reason for this success is probably that the canonical model can 
take leverage on the competitive paradigm of economic theory.   
 
In equilibrium, identical consumers establish themselves within the city so as to equalize utility across 
space. In such a state, no one has an incentive to change location, the land rent at a particular location 
being equal to the largest bid at that location. Building on this idea, urban economists have endeavored 
to explain the internal structure of cities, that is, how land is distributed across activities and economic 
agents a r o u n d  t h e  c e n t r a l  b u s i n e s s  d i s t r i c t .  Though  very  simple,  the  monocentric  city  model  has 
produced a set of results consistent with the prominent features of cities. In particular, it explains the 
decrease in the urban land rent with distance away from the city center as well as the fall in the 
population density as one move away from the center. The model also explains how the development 
of modern transportation means (cars and mass transportation) has generated both suburbanization and 
a  flattening  of  urban  population  densities,  an  evolution  known  as  urban  sprawl.  The  today-best 
synthesis of the results derived within the monocentric framework remains the landmark book of 
Fujita (1989).  
 
(b) Very much as in the Thünen model which does not say why transactions take place in a given 
market town, the monocentric city model is silent on the reasons that would explain the existence of a   6 
district where jobs are available. So, we are left with the following question: why do city centers exist? 
Or,  more  generally,  why  do  cities  exist?  This q u e s t i o n  h a s h a unted  geographical  economics f o r  
decades.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, the first socio-economic explanation for the existence of cities has been 
put forward by Cantillon (1755). According to this author, the origin of cities was to be found in the 
concentration of land ownership which allows landowners to live at a distance from their estates in 
places where they “enjoy agreeable society”, and in the landowners’ demand which attracts craftsmen 
and merchants. Beckmann (1976) agreed with this idea by viewing personal relations are the essence 
of societies, even though the consequences of relations are often double-edged. The propensity to 
interact with others has a gravitational nature in that its intensity increases with the number of people 
living in each location and decreases with the distance between two locations. Beckmann then focused 
on the trade-off between the desire of an individual to interact with others and her need to consume a 
large plot of land. Under such preferences, the spatial equilibrium exhibits a bell-shaped population 
density  supported  by  a  similarly  shaped  land  rent  curve,  and  thus  face-to-face  contact  supports 
urbanization. This provides an illuminating explanation for the existence of cities, which combines the 
natural gregariousness of human beings together with their desire to consume more space.  
 
Although  very  suggestive,  this  approach  does  not  explain  the  existence  of  an  employment  center 
because  firms  are  left  aside.  Thus,  beyond  the  standard  market  transactions  in  which  firms  are 
involved, one may wonder what the interactions that would foster their concentration are. The reason 
here is very different from what Beckmann assumed in that it refers to the role of information as a 
basic input in firms’ activities, a kind of information difficult to codify because it is tacit and which 
can be collected through face-to-face communications only. The exchange of information between 
firms generates externality-like benefits for each of them. Provided that firms own different pieces of 
information,  the  benefits  of  communication  generally  increase  as  the  number  of  firms  rises.  The 
quality of the information is also better when firms are gathered in that the number of intermediates is 
smaller. Because communications typically involve distance-decay effects, the benefits are greater if 
firms locate within the same district. 
 
The  seminal  contribution  in  this  respect  is  due  to  Ogawa  and  Fujita  (1980)  who e x p l o r e d t h e  
implications of spillovers, the intensity of which is affected negatively by a distance-decay effect. 
Specifically, the agglomeration force finds its origin in the existence of the exchange of information 
which allow companies to learn from each other how to do things better. The transmission of tacit 
knowledge  and  information  often  requires  face-to-face c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a g e n t s , w h ich 
typically involve distance-sensitive costs. Hence the benefits of information are larger when firms 
locate closer to each other. On the other hand, the clustering of many firms into a single area increases 
the average commuting distance for their workers which, in turn, leads to higher wages and land rent 
in  the  area  surrounding  the  cluster.  Such  high  wages  and  land  rents  tend  to  discourage  the 
agglomeration of firms and acts as a dispersion force. Consequently, the equilibrium distributions of 
firms and households/workers are determined as the balance between these two opposite forces.   
 
Ogawa and Fujita showed that high commuting costs lead to the completely-mixed configuration, that 
is,  a  pattern  with  no  land  specialization  and  no  commuting.  As  commuting  costs  fall  while  the 
intensity  of  communication  between  firms  rises  (two  fairly  general  trends  observed  since  the 
development of the Industrial Revolution), one moves from backyard capitalism to a monocentric city 
with completely specialization of land. In other words, low commuting costs and/or strong spatial 
externalities foster the emergence of a monocentric city in which firms gather to form a CBD.  
 
Ogawa and Fujita treated the firm as a single entity, disregarding the fact that modern firms conduct 
some of its activities in front-offices located in the city center while the rest of their activities are 
carried out in back-offices set up at the city outskirts. Keeping the other assumptions of Ogawa and 
Fujita unchanged, Ota and Fujita (1993) assumed that front-units interact with other front-units for 
business communications, while back-units exchange information or management services only with   7 
their  own  front-units.  In  such  a  context,  the  following  additional  force  is  at  work:  as  intra-firm 
communication costs get smaller, back-units separate from front-units to set up in places where land is 
cheaper. Once both commuting costs and intra-firm communication costs are sufficiently low, the 
market outcome involves the agglomeration of front-units that form the CBD, which is surrounded by 
a  residential  area,  while  back-units  are  established  at  the  outskirts  of  the  city  together  with  their 
employees. 
 
(c) Since then, urban economics has explored a much broader range of issues. It is worth mentioning 
here that modern models of neighboring effects and segregation originate in the pioneering work of 
Schelling (1969, 1971). Urban economics now has strong links to theories of social networks and 
other forms of local interactions, the urban neighborhood being the place where many nonmarket 
relationships are developed (Durlauf, 2004). It is also closely related to new growth theories through 
the study of the microeconomic foundations of agglomeration economies (Duranton and Puga, 2004).  
  
Despite  such  remarkable  progresses, t h e  m o s t  e n d u r i n g  p r o b l e m  i n  u r b a n  e c o n o m i c s ,  that  is,  the 
existence of an urban hierarchy involving large and medium-sized cities as well as towns and villages, 
remains unsolved. Although Christaller (1933-[1966]) has forcefully argued that the number of goods 
supplied in a city rises with its size, with the manufactured goods supplied in a low-rank city being 
also supplied in cities of higher rank, there is still no comprehensive microeconomic model explaining 
the urban hierarchy. Lösch (1940-[1954]) provided many important insights but failed to build an 
analytical  framework  that  could  be  used  in  subsequent  research.  In  his  analysis,  different  market 
patterns are arranged in a way such that all manufactured goods supplied in a low-rank city are also 
supplied  in  cities  of  higher  rank.  These  considerations  are  only  interesting  if  they  are  based  on 
microeconomic foundations. If there are no economic forces which lead firms of different types to 
cluster, it is hard to see why a central place system such as the one proposed by Lösch would be more 
likely to emerge than any other configuration.  
 
So  far,  the  most  elegant  proposal  to  describe  how  cities  having  different  sizes  emerge  has  been 
provided  by  Henderson  (1974,  1988) w h o s e  w o r k  h a s  s e r v e d  a s  a  f o u n d a t i o n  t o  a  l a r g e  f l o w  o f  
research on urban systems (Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004). In each city, there is again a tension 
between two forces. On the one hand, there are external economies associated with the agglomeration 
of  firms  at  the c i t y -center.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  diseconomies  generated  by  the  need  to 
commute to the city-center. Hence, in equilibrium, each city has a well-defined size that depends on 
the type of firms it accommodates. As cities vary in their industrial mix, they have different sizes 
because  industries  differ  in  the  external  economies  they  are  able  to  create.  The  setting  remains 
incomplete,  however.  Cities  are  like  floating  islands  because  nothing  is  said  about  their  relative 
locations. Furthermore, the model is silent on why a few cities are diversified, whereas the others are 
specialized in particular activities. 
 
3. The nature of competition in space 
     
The debate about whether the general competitive equilibrium model is comprehensive enough to 
fully reflect the working of the spatial economy has a long history. When Isard (1949) critically 
discussed  general  equilibrium  analysis,  he  was  mainly  concerned  with  Hicks's  Value  and  Capital 
published  in  1939.  Isard  concluded  that  Hicks  confined  himself  to  “a  wonderland  of  no  spatial 
dimensions.” He further elaborated this point on page 477 in which he recorded a conversation he had 
with Schumpeter, who defended the Hicksian analysis, maintaining that “transport cost is implicitly 
contained in production cost, and thus Hicksian analysis is sufficiently comprehensive.” In contrast, 
Isard argued that: “production theory ... cannot justifiably treat certain production costs explicitly and 
other important ones implicitly in order to avoid the obstacles to analysis which the latter present.”   8 
Schumpeter’s argument is a typical example of how general economists viewed the role of space in 
economic theory.
5    
 
Allais (1943), as well as Arrow and Debreu (1954), made another attempt to integrate space within 
general equilibrium analysis. Specifically, they assume that a commodity is defined not only by its 
physical characteristics but also by the place where it is made available. This implies that the same 
good traded at different places is treated as different economic commodities. Consequently, the Law of 
One Price does not hold whenever space is taken into account because the same good available in 
different  places  is  supplied  at  different  prices. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  a b o v e  a p p r o a c h  i n t e g r a t e s  s p a t i a l  
interdependence  across  markets  into  general  equilibrium  in  the  same  way  as  other  forms  of 
interdependence: location choices are contained in the specification of the production or consumption 
plans selected by firms and households. Hence, the Arrow-Debreu model seems to obviate the need 
for a space-specific theory of prices and markets. As illustrated by the vast literature initiated by 
Cournot (1838) and Samuelson (1952), standard general equilibrium theory has shown to be very 
useful for the study of commodity flows across space provided that both firms and households have 
exogenously  given  locations  (Takayama  and  Judge,  1971).  However,  as  highlighted  by  Krugman 
(1995) and discussed below, things become more problematic once agents are free to choose their 
locations. 
 
3.1 The spatial impossibility theorem  
 
(a)  I b e g i n  the d i s c u s s i o n  b y  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  a s s i g n m e n t  p r o b l e m s  i n t r o d u c e d  b y  K o o p m a n s  a n d  
Beckmann (1957). Assume that n firms are to be assigned to n locations. Each firm is indivisible, and 
the amount of land available at each location is such that a single firm can be set up there. Hence, 
every firm must be assigned to a single location, and every location can accommodate only one firm. 
Each firm produces a fixed amount of goods and uses one unit of land. Suppose further that the 
technology used by each firm is not affected by the chosen location. Koopmans and Beckmann first 
considered the linear assignment problem in which firms receive revenues from the rest of the world, 
which are location-specific. They showed that this problem can be expressed as a linear program, the 
solution of which is given by integer numbers. Since the shadow prices generated by the dual of this 
program  are  location-specific,  these  prices h a v e  t h e  n a t u r e   of  land  rents.  Thus,  a  competitive 
equilibrium exists since the optimal solution may be decentralized through a competitive land market, 
very much as in Thünen. 
 
Koopmans and Beckmann then turned to the quadratic assignment problem in which each firm uses 
the goods produced by the others and bears the corresponding transportation costs. Because of the 
exchange of goods, this problem cannot be expressed as a linear program anymore. When locations 
generate similar revenues, Koopmans and Beckmann showed that no feasible location pattern of firms 
can  be  sustained  as  a  competitive  equilibrium,  thus  implying  that  there  exists  no  competitive 
equilibrium. Revisiting the quadratic assignment problem, Heffley (1972) showed that decentralization 
is possible when sites have very different comparative advantages. Hence, as Hamilton (1980, 38) put 
it: “Stability is lent to the system by having plants differ from one another in their preferences for the 
sites qua sites, and instability arises from a large volume of trade among plants.” 
 
(b) In the long debate concerning the comprehensiveness of general equilibrium theory for the spatial 
economy,  Starrett  (1978)  has  made  the  fundamental  contribution.  The  question  is  whether  the 
competitive price mechanism is able to explain the endogenous formation of economic agglomerations 
and  the  existence  of  large  trade  flows. B e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  n o t  p e r f e c t l y  d i v i s i b l e ,  agents  are  not 
ubiquitous and, therefore, must choose an “address.” Space is then said to be homogeneous if (1) the 
utility function of each household is identical no matter what his location and (2) the production 
                                                 
5  Soon  after  the  publication  of  Location  and  Space-economy  in  1956,  however,  Isard  turned  his  attention  to  the 
“spatialization” of the competitive general equilibrium model and did not provide the spatial model of imperfect competition 
he called for in his book.    9 
function of each firm is independent of its location. In other words, the location choice made by a 
consumer or a producer does not affect her preferences or the technologies that are available. The 
spatial impossibility theorem may then be stated as follows:  
 
Consider an economy with a finite number of locations. If space is homogeneous, transport is costly, 
and preferences are locally non-satiated, then there exists no competitive equilibrium involving the 
transport of goods between locations. 
 
Consequently, the perfectly competitive price mechanism alone is unable to deal simultaneously with 
cities and trade. This has a fundamental implication for geographical economics: if the purpose is to 
build a theory explaining the formation of economic agglomerations, then such a theory must depart 
from general competitive analysis. What is the meaning of this result? Whenever economic activities 
are perfectly divisible, the spatial impossibility theorem implies that the mobility of production factors 
is a perfect substitute for trade. Such a result is hardly surprising because every activity can be carried 
out on an arbitrarily small scale in every possible place, without any loss of efficiency. Firms and 
households are then induced to suppress all distance-related costs by producing exactly what they need 
where  they  are.  In  contrast,  as  pointed  out  by  Starrett  (1978,  27),  “so  long  as  there  are  some 
indivisibilities in the system (so that individual operations must take up space) then a sufficiently 
complicated  set  of  interrelated  activities  will  generate  transport  costs.”  In  this  case,  the  spatial 
impossibility theorem tells us something really new and important: whenever agents have to choose an 
address,  there  is  no  competitive  equilibrium  (hence  the  term  “impossibility”  in  the  name  of  the 
theorem) such that trade across space occurs. In other words, factor mobility and interregional trade 
are incompatible in the standard neoclassical world. This result is especially meaningful insofar as it is 
internal to the theory itself. 
 
Intuitively, the reason for this is that the only location factor that matters to an agent is its position 
with respect to the others. In this case, the price system must play two different roles: (1) it must allow 
trade between locations while guaranteeing that all local markets clear and (2) it must give firms and 
households  the  incentives  not  to  change  location.  Once  the  economy  is  competitive  and  space 
homogeneous, the spatial impossibility theorem tells us that it is impossible to kill two birds with one 
stone: prices that sustain commodity flows between places send incorrect signals from the point of 
view of the stability of locations, and vice versa. The fundamental reason for the spatial impossibility 
theorem is the non-convexity of the set of feasible allocations caused by positive trade costs and the 
fact that agents have an address in space, even though the individual land consumption is endogenous. 
This  non-convexity  is  caused  by  the  combination  of  two  elements:  (1)  the  existences  of  positive 
transport costs and (2) the fact that agents have an address in space (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Hence, 
absent external factors that drive firms’ and households’ locations and render space heterogeneous, 
such as the existence of a market town or of spatial externalities, a sound spatial economic theory 
cannot be built within the competitive general equilibrium framework by differentiating goods through 
their locations and adding land as a new commodity. 
 
To a large extent, the modelling constraints have led economists to concentrate on the combination 
involving constant returns and perfect competition. However, this paradigm is unable to cope with the 
emergence and growth of large economic agglomerations. Mills (1972, 4) very suggestively described 
this  strange  “world  without  cities” t h a t  w o u l d  c h a r a c t e r i z e  a n  e c o n o m y  o p e r a t i n g  u n d e r  c o n s t a n t  
returns and perfect competition as follows: “Each acre of land would contain the same number of 
people and the same mix of productive activities. The crucial point in establishing this result is that 
constant returns permit each productive activity to be carried on at an arbitrary level without loss of 
efficiency. Furthermore, all land is equally productive and equilibrium requires that the value of the 
marginal product, and hence its rent, be the same everywhere. Therefore, in equilibrium, all the inputs 
and outputs necessary directly and indirectly to meet the demands of consumers can be located in a 
small area near where consumers live. In that way, each small area can be autarkic and transportation 
of people and goods can be avoided.” Such an economic space is the quintessence of self-sufficiency: 
If  the  distribution  of  endowments  is  uniform  the  economy  reduces  to  a  Robinson  Crusoe-type   10 
economy where each person produces for his own consumption, an outcome that has been coined 
“backyard capitalism”. 
 
All  of  this  was  already  clear  to  Koopmans  (1957,  154),  who  was  a  major  contributor  to  general 
equilibrium theory, when he claimed that “without recognizing indivisibilities - in human person, in 
residences, plants, equipment, and in transportation - urban location problems, down to those of the 
smallest village, cannot be understood.” What Starrett brought about is a formal proof of Koopmans’ 
intuition.  
 
3.2 Spatial competition theory 
 
(a) Because consumers are dispersed across space, they differ in their access to the same firm. In such 
a context, firms anticipate accurately that each consumer will buy from the firm posting the lower full 
price,  namely  the  price  at  the  firm’s  gate,  called  mill  price,  augmented  by  the  travel  costs  that 
consumers must bear to go to the firm they patronize. As a consequence, firms have some monopoly 
power on the consumers located in their vicinity, which enables them to choose their price. Of course, 
this choice is restricted by the possibility that consumers have to supply themselves from competing 
firms. This process of competition among spatially dispersed firms has been described by Launhardt 
(1885-[1993]) who proposed a model of price formation, in which he anticipated the concept of Nash 
equilibrium. In particular, he was the first to show what became to be known as the Principle of 
Differentiation in industrial organization: “the improvement of means of transport is dangerous for 
costly goods: these lose the most effective protection of all tariff protections, namely that provided by 
bad roads.” (page 150 of the English translation). In other words, firms want to be separated to relax 
price competition. 
 
(b)  Launhardt‘s  contribution  remained  ignored  outside  the  German-speaking  scientific  community 
until recently.
6 Hotelling (1929), who came up more than 40 years later, has had more impact although 
the path-breaking nature of his paper has been fully recognized when economists became aware of the 
power of non-cooperative game theory. The value and importance of Hotelling’s contribution was 
brought to light in the 1980s by showing that its use exceeds the original geographical interpretation to 
accommodate various dimensions that differentiates firms and consumers. To be precise, the spatial 
framework may serve as a powerful metaphor for dealing with issues involving heterogeneity and 
diversity across agents in a host of economic, political and social domains. In addition, Hotelling’s 
paper may be viewed as one of the prototypes of the modern economic literature: it is self-contained 
and focuses on a specific problem, which is studied by means of a simple and elegant model. 
  
Because  any  single  consumer  is  negligible  to  firms,  Hotelling  assumed t h a t  c o n s u m e r s  a r e  
continuously  distributed  along  a  linear  and  bounded  segment - t h i n k  o f Ma i n  St r e e t .  Two stores, 
aiming to maximize their respective profits, seek a location along the same segment. Each firm being 
aware that its price choice affects the consumer segment supplied by its rival, spatial competition is, 
therefore, inherently strategic. This is one of the main innovations introduced by Hotelling who uses a 
two-stage game to model the process of spatial competition: in the first stage, stores choose their 
location non-cooperatively; in the second, these locations being publicly observed, firms select their 
selling price. The use of a sequential procedure means that firms anticipate the consequences of their 
location c h o i c e s  o n  t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  c h o i c e s  o f  p r i c e s ,  t h u s  c o n f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  m o d e l  a n  i m p l i c i t  
dynamic structure. The game is solved by backward induction. For an arbitrary pair of locations, 
Hotelling  starts  by  solving  the  price  sub-game  corresponding  to  the  second  stage.  The  resulting 
equilibrium prices are introduced into the profit functions, which then depend only upon the locations 
chosen by the firms. These functions stand for the payoffs that firms will maximize during the first 
stage of the game. Such an approach anticipates by several decades the concept of sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium introduced by Selten in the 1960s. 
 
                                                 
6 See Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996) for a modern game-theoretic presentation of Launhardt ‘s ideas.   11 
Hotelling’s conclusion was that the process of spatial competition leads firms to agglomerate at the 
market center. If true, this provides us with a rationale for the observed spatial concentration of firms 
selling similar goods (e.g. restaurants, movie theaters, fashion cloth shops). Unfortunately, Hotelling’s 
analysis was plagued by a mistake that invalidates his main conclusion: when firms are sufficiently 
close, the corresponding sub-game does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (d’Aspremont 
et al., 1979). Therefore, the payoffs used in the first-stage game are not defined for a range of location 
pairs, which prevents the study of location game. As a result, Hotelling’s conclusion that firms want to 
set up back-to-back at the market center is flawed.  
 
This negative result has led d’Aspremont et al. to modify the Hotelling setting by assuming that the 
travel costs borne by consumers are quadratic in the distance covered, instead of being linear as in 
Hotelling. This new assumption captures the idea that the marginal cost of time increases with the 
length of the trip to the store. In this modified version, d’Aspremont et al. show that any price sub-
game has one and only one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Plugging these prices into the profit 
functions, they show that firms choose to set up at the two extremities of the linear segment.  Firms do 
so because this allows them to relax price competition and to restore their profit margins. Therefore, 
the slight change made by d’Aspremont et al. leads to conclusions that completely differ from those 
obtained by Hotelling. 
 
(c)  In  his  review  of  Chamberlin’s  book, T h e T h e o r y  o f  Monopolistic  Competition,  Kaldor  (1935) 
forcefully argued that, once it is recognized that firms operate in space, each one competes directly 
with only a few neighboring firms regardless of the total number of firms in the industry. The very 
nature of competition in space is, therefore, oligopolistic, thus casting serious doubt on the relevance 
of monopolistic competition as a market structure. Beckmann (1972b) has developed a full analytical 
treatment of spatial competition in a well-crafted paper that went unnoticed, probably because it was 
published in a journal having a low visibility in the economics profession. In addition, Beckmann’s 
main  results  were  rediscovered  by  Salop  (1979)  in  a  paper  that  became  famous  in  industrial 
organization. These two authors show how free entry may determine the equilibrium number of firms 
operating under increasing returns and competing oligopolistically with adjacent firms. Among other 
things,  their  analysis  shows  in  a  very  precise  way  how  the  market  solves  the  trade-off  between 
increasing returns (internal to firms) and transport costs. 
 
Building respectively on Kaldor and Hotelling, Eaton and Lipsey (1977) and Gabszewicz and Thisse 
(1986) have provided syntheses that help to clarify what spatial competition theory is about and what 
it can accomplish. This work was timely. Indeed, Salop was not aware of the contributions made by 
his  four  predecessors  (Launhardt,  Hotelling,  Kaldor,  and  Beckmann),  who  all  had  a  clear 
understanding of the nature of competition in space. This list of unrelated contributions, which cover 
almost one century, provides evidence of the very dispersed and fragmented nature of research in 
spatial economics until the emergence of new economic geography, which has served as a catalyst.  
 
Increasing returns and strategic competition are, therefore, the basic ingredients of a relevant theory of 
spatial equilibrium. The difficulty of the task has put off more than one scholar. Exaggerating a little, 
we may say that the ability of the competitive model to tackle various issues as well as the absence of 
alternative models have generated a lock-in effect that economists had a lot of trouble escaping. It is, 
therefore, not totally surprising that the surge of new economic geography took place a few years after 
the revival of monopolistic competition and industrial organization, from which it borrows many ideas 
and concepts.  
 
(d) As seen above, when firms sell a homogeneous good, they want to avoid spatial clustering because 
price competition has devastating effects upon them. It should be kept in mind, however, that this 
result is based on an extreme price sensitivity of consumers: If two firms are located side by side with 
identical prices, a small price reduction of one firm will attract all the customers. Such an extreme 
behavior seems unwarranted. When the product is differentiated and when consumers like product 
variety, the aggregate response to a price cut will not be so abrupt because the quality of product   12 
match matters to consumers. By turning the picture around, this observation suggests that firms selling 
differentiated goods may want to gather at some central market location, because price competition is 
now weakened (de Palma et al., 1985). 
 
When transport costs are low, the benefits of geographical separation are reduced and prices are lower. 
Firms then choose to reconstruct their profit margins by differentiating their products along some non-
geographical characteristics that are tangible or intangible. Stated differently, product differentiation is 
substituted  for  geographical  dispersion.  In  this  case,  firms  no  longer  fear  the  effects  of  price 
competition and strive to be as close as possible to the consumers with whom the matching is the best. 
Because these consumers are spread all over the market space, firms set up at the market centre and, 
therefore, minimize their geographical differentiation. This result agrees with market potential theory, 
as developed by Harris (1954) in classical economic geography according to which firms tend to 
locate where they have the “best” access to markets in which they can sell their product. 
4. New economic geography 
 
The existence of interregional inequalities has long attracted the attention of economists, especially in 
the area known as “regional economics.” For a long time, however, regional concepts, models and 
techniques  were  a  mere  extension  of  those  used  at  the  national  level,  with  an  additional  index 
identifying the different regions—think of interregional input-output matrices. Despite valuable earlier 
contributions, no one before Krugman (1991b) had been able to show how regional imbalances could 
arise within the realm of economic theory.
7 In a way, Krugman built on Bertil Ohlin’s work without 
knowing it (Krugman, 1999). Indeed, Ohlin (1933; 1968, 97) has challenged the common wisdom that 
considers international trade theory as separate from location theory long ago: “international trade 
theory cannot be understood except in relation to and as part of the general location theory, to which 
the lack of mobility of goods and factors has equal relevance.”  
 
In the 1950s, several development theorists put forward a principle that allowed them to uncover the 
underpinnings  of  unequal  development—a  principle  that  has  been  ignored,  however,  for  several 
decades—that of circular or cumulative causation. Myrdal (1957, 13) sums up these ideas in the 
following paragraph: “The idea I want to expound in this book is that…there is no such tendency 
towards automatic self-stabilisation in the social system. The system is by itself not moving towards 
any sort of balance between forces, but is constantly on the move away from such a situation. In the 
normal case a change does not call forth countervailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, 
which move the system in the same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such 
circular  causation  a  social  process  tends  to  become  cumulative  and  often  to  gather  speed  at  an 
accelerating rate.” Applied to geographical economics, this principle says that regional disparities are 
driven by a “snowball effect,” which results in its continuous reinforcement once it is set in motion. 
Krugman (1991b, 486) states the same idea when he writes: “manufactures production will tend to 
concentrate where there is a large market, but the market will be large where manufactures production 
is concentrated.” Before proceeding, it is worth stressing that Krugman achieves his objectives by 
using a Chamberlinian model of monopolistic competition, such as those criticized by Kaldor (1935) 
because they do not permit to encompass the idea of localized competition. 
 
4.1 The core-periphery structure 
 
It is by marrying the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition with the iceberg 
transport  technology  that  Krugman  (1991b)  may  find  out  when  and  why  Myrdal’s  prediction 
materializes. The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition relies on product differentiation 
and  increasing  returns  at  the  firm’s  level,  as  in  spatial  competition.  Unlike  spatial  competition, 
however,  monopolistic  competition  involves  weak  interactions  among  firms,  which  respond t o  
                                                 
7 In the 1970s, another prominent trade theorist, R.G. Lipsey, vastly contributed, with B.C. Eaton, to the development of 
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aggregate market statistics only. The iceberg cost means that only a fraction of good shipped between 
two places reaches the destination, the missing share having “melted” on the way. This ingenious 
modeling trick,  due  to  Samuelson  (1954), a l l o ws  o n e  t o   integrate p o s i t i v e  shipping c o s t s  wi t h o u t  
having to deal explicitly with a transport sector. As for the other ingredients of his model, Krugman 
considers a standard setting that involves two regions, two sectors, and two types of labor. The former 
sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns and perfect competition, using one type 
of labor which is spatially immobile. The latter sector supplies a horizontally differentiated good under 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns, using the other type of labor which is mobile across 
space.  
 
The fundamental feature that makes this model different from those developed in new trade theory 
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985) is the interregional mobility of one production factor. How footloose 
workers  distribute  themselves  across  space  determines  the  interregional  distribution  of  economic 
activities  and  the  intensity  of  spatial  inequality.  When  workers  are  evenly  distributed,  the  global 
pattern of production is symmetric and there is no spatial inequality. If not, one region accommodates 
a larger share of activities, and thus regional disparities arise.  
 
When  footloose  workers  move  to  a  new  region,  they  bring  with  them  both  their  production  and 
consumption capabilities. As a result, their movements affect the size of labor and product markets in 
both  the  origin  and  destination  regions.  These  effects  have  the  nature  of  pecuniary  externalities 
because  migrating  workers  do  not  take  them  into  account  in  their  decisions.  Moreover,  such 
externalities  are  of  particular  importance  in  imperfectly  competitive  markets,  where  prices  fail  to 
reflect the true social value of individual decisions. Hence, the effects of migration are best studied 
within a general equilibrium framework, where one can capture not only the interactions between 
spatially separated (product and labor) markets, but also the dual role of individual-as-worker and 
individual-as-consumer. The great accomplishment of Krugman (1991b) was to integrate all these 
effects  within  a  single  framework  and  to  determine  precisely  the  conditions  under  which  the 
cumulative process predicted by Myrdal occurs or not. Turning next to the specific conditions for 
agglomeration, Krugman has shown that the value of transport costs is the key-determining factor.  
 
If transport costs are sufficiently low, then all footloose workers will concentrate in a single core 
region, whereas the peripheral region supplies only the standardized good. In this way, firms are able 
to exploit increasing returns by selling more goods in the larger market without losing much business 
in the smaller market. It is worth stressing here that the core-periphery structure is the involuntary 
consequence of decisions made by a large number of economic agents pursuing their own interests. By 
contrast, if transport costs are sufficiently high, then interregional shipments of goods are discouraged. 
Hence the economy displays a symmetric regional pattern of production in which firms focus on local 
markets.  The  core-periphery  model  thus  allows  for  the  possibility  of  convergence  or  divergence 
between regions, whereas the neoclassical model, based on constant returns and perfect competition in 
the two sectors, would predict convergence only. Consequently, it is fair to say that Krugman has 
presented a synthesis of the polarization and standard neo-classical theories.  
 
4.2 The bell-shaped curve and regional growth 
 
The core-periphery model relies on a set of strong assumptions. It therefore has triggered a huge flow 
of contributions, which have made new economic geography one of the most lively research topics of 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Fujita et al. (1999) is the first place where to go to, whereas Neary (2001) 
remains the best critical review of the canonical model.   
 
Krugman’s pioneering contribution has been criticized for various reasons. When integrated within 
broader frameworks, these new effects deliver a seemingly different message. If economic integration 
is  indeed  capable  of  initially  fostering  a  more  intensive  agglomeration  of  economic  activities,  its 
continuation is liable to generate a redeployment of activities that could lead to a kind of geographical   14 
evening-out. In short, one may expect the process of spatial development to unfold according to a bell-
shaped  curve.  As  will  be  seen  below,  the  bell-curve b e t w e e n  e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  s p a t i a l  
inequality emerges in a number of contexts, thus endowing this relationship with strong theoretical 
foundations.  
 
In particular, one of the main criticisms of the core-periphery model is that it ignores the congestion 
costs generated by the gathering of people and firms within the same territory. In particular, armchair 
evidence shows that a human settlement of a sizable scale almost inevitably takes on the form of a 
city, as in Section 2.2. As a consequence, a growing concentration of people intensifies competition 
for land and, therefore, leads to higher housing costs and longer commuting. In other words, even 
when nominal wages increase with employment density, housing and commuting costs, as well as 
pollution and crimes, make such large agglomerations less attractive. 
 
As transport costs steadily decrease, the spatial economy now moves through three phases instead of 
two: d i s p e r s i o n ,  a g g l o m e r a t i o n ,  a n d  r e -dispersion  of  the  mobile s e c t o r  ( Helpman,  1998;  Tabuchi, 
1998). Agglomeration arises in the second phase for the reasons highlighted in the core-periphery 
model. The dispersion in the first and third phases emerges for very different reasons. In the first 
phase, firms are dispersed because shipping their output is expensive whereas, in the third phase, 
dispersion occurs because housing and commuting costs are too high for the agglomeration to be 
sustainable.  Put  differently,  beyond  some  threshold c o n g e s t i o n  p r o m p t s  f i r m s  a n d  w o r k e r s  t o  r e -
disperse in order to alleviate the corresponding costs. In the limit, high commuting costs are sufficient 
to prevent the formation of a large city and guarantee the continuation of industrial activities within 
several small cities, a situation fairly characteristic of preindustrial economies.  
 
Another  major  shortcoming  of  the  core-periphery  model  is  that  it  overlooks  the  importance  of 
intermediate goods. Yet, the demand for consumer goods does not account for a very large fraction of 
firms’ sales, being often overshadowed by the demand for intermediate goods. Therefore, in making 
their location choices, it makes sense for intermediate-goods producers to care about the places where 
final goods are produced; similarly, final-goods producers are likely to pay close attention to where 
intermediate-goods  suppliers  are  located.  Giving  intermediate  goods  a  prominent  role  is  a  clear 
departure from the core-periphery model, which allows one to focus on other forces that are at work in 
modern economies. To this end, note that, once workers are immobile, a higher concentration of firms 
within a region translates to an increase in wages for this region. This gives rise to two opposite forces. 
On the one hand, final demand in the core region increases because consumers enjoy higher incomes. 
As in Krugman, final demand is an agglomeration force; however, it is no longer sparked by an 
increase in population size, but by an increase in income. On the other hand, an increase in the wage 
level  generates  a  new  dispersion  force,  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  many  debates  regarding  the 
deindustrialization of developed countries, i.e., their high labor costs. In such a context, firms are 
induced to relocate their activities to the periphery when lower wages more than offset lower demand 
(Krugman and Venables, 1995). 
 
A growing number of firms choose to break down their production process into various stages spread 
across space. Specifically, the modern firm organizes and performs its activities in distinct locations, 
which  altogether  form  a  supply  chain s t a r ting  at  the  conception  of  the  product  and  ending  at  its 
delivery.  This  spatial  fragmentation  of  production  aims  at  taking  advantage  of  differences  in 
technologies, factor endowments, or factor prices across. The most commonly observed pattern is such 
that firms relocate their production activities in low-wage regions or countries, while keeping their 
strategic functions (e.g. management, R&D, marketing and finance) concentrated in a few affluent 
urban regions where the high-skilled workers they need are available. Two main scenarios are to be 
distinguished as they lead to very different patterns (Fujita and Thisse, 2006). When communication 
costs are high, all firms are national and established in the core region. Once communication costs 
steadily  decrease,  the  industry  moves  toward  a  configuration  in  which  some  firms  become   15 
multinational whereas others remain national. Eventually, when these costs have reached a sufficiently 
low level, the economy ends up with a de-industrialized core that retains only.
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Last,  new  economic  geography  models  rely o n  a  fairly  naive a s s u m p t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  migration 
behavior: individuals care only for real wages. Leaving aside migratory movements triggered by wars, 
people are heterogeneous in their perception of the non-economic attributes of the different regions, 
and this heterogeneity affects the nature and intensity of migration flows, as for shopping behavior in 
Section 3.2. Because labor mobility is also driven by non-economic variables, workers do not react to 
economic  inequalities  in  the  same  way.  In  such  a  context,  the  bell-shaped c u r v e  e m e r g e s  a g a i n : 
workers move to the core when spatial inequalities are large but stay put when they are small (Tabuchi 
and Thisse, 2002). This is because workers bestow increasing relative weight on noneconomic factors 
affecting the quality of their life once they have achieved a sufficiently high material welfare. If this 
premise is correct, both economic growth and the development of the welfare state combine to slow 
down  individuals’  mobility,  by  allowing  them  to  satisfy  their  needs  for  socializing  and/or  their 
attachment to a certain environment.  
 
The benefits of using the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition are reap when we 
turn to regional growth because new economic geography and endogenous growth theories have been 
built on the same setting, thus making it easier to combine these two bodies of research within a 
unified framework. The contributions reviewed by Baldwin and Martin (2004) emphasize the possible 
geographical concentration of the innovation sector. Innovation being one of the main sources of the 
long-term  growth  of  the  economy,  this i n n o v a t i o n -driven  concentration  supplements t h e  c o r e -
periphery  effect  to  generate  long-run  patterns  characterized  by  persistent  and  sizable  income 
differences. In other words, the predominant centers would retain the high value-added activities, 
whereas the routine activities would be relocated into the periphery. This challenges the unfolding of 
the bell-shaped curve and keeps open the debate on the spatial diffusion of economic development. 
However, thanks to new economic geography, we understand much better the various forces at work. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The (relative) absence of space in economic theory lies in the attempt made by economists to develop 
a rigorous theory of markets and prices. This attempt has led them, through a series of simplifications 
and shortcuts taken long ago, to focus on the combination “constant returns and perfect competition” 
with consequences for geographical economics that are comparable to those for growth theory (Warsh, 
2006). This state of affairs might have arisen because economists believe that location and distance 
have only a marginal influence on the way the economy operates. Actually, it is more likely due to the 
particularly acute methodological problems caused by the integration of space into existing theoretical 
frameworks. However, while the lack of interest manifested by many economists about spatial issues 
is regrettable, the opposite attitude (disinterest in economic theory as a whole on the grounds that it is 
a-spatial) is untenable. This attitude long characterized traditional regional economists, and it largely 
explains the stagnation of this field (Krugman, 1995).  
 
The present state of the art in geographical economics is the outcome of a two-sided process. The first 
side involves regional scientists who felt the need to root their field in economic theory. For a long 
time, because the emphasis was on city and transportation planning, regional science focused more on 
optimization  techniques t h a n  o n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a n a l y s e s .
9 D e s p i t e  s o m e  m u t u a l  i g n o r a n c e  b e t w e e n  
economists  and  regional  scientists,  most  of  the  main c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  r e g i o n a l  s c i e n c e  h a v e  b e e n  
incorporated into the realm of economic theory, often after some delay. Among the community of 
regional  scientists,  even  though  Isard  (1956)  remains  a  classic  because  of  the  many  insights  it 
                                                 
8 The fragmentation of the firm is similar to the one stressed by Ota and Fujita (1993) but both the spatial scales and the 
reasons explaining it are very different.   
9 See Isard (2003) for a historical overview of regional science.   16 
contains. One scholar stands out, namely Masahisa Fujita whose contributions have been acclaimed by 
the economics profession. The second side involves the few economists who faced the challenges 
posed by the introduction of space in economic theory, such as Martin Beckmann and Edwin Mills. 
Their task was not an easy one since space is plagued with all the difficulties that one may encounter 
in standard economic theory: non-convexities, externalities and imperfect competition.  
 
New  and  important  domains  have  been  explored  by  regional  scientists,  which  have  been  far  too 
ignored by economists. One prominent example is provided by spatial interaction theory. Very much 
like in Newtonian physics, it has been recognized for long that cities and countries interact according 
to forces that have a gravitational nature: the intensity of bilateral interactions rises with the size of the 
spatial entities but falls with the distance that separates them (Carrothers, 1956). Spatial interaction 
theory aims to explain such movements of goods and people. To this end, regional scientists and 
geographers have developed several models, ranging from the entropy (Wilson, 1967) to the gravity 
and logit models (Anas, 1983), which has proven to be very effective in predicting different types of 
flows.  By  ignoring  for  a  long  time  this  body  of  research,  spatial  economists  have  missed  a 
fundamental ingredient of the space-economy.
10 
 
The contributions to geographical economics made by economists have been long confined to a small 
circle  of isolated specialists. The situation has vastly changed,  as  shown  by  the  launching  of  the 
Journal  of  Economic  Geography a n d  t h e  r e c e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  s e v e r al  textbooks  aiming  to  make 
accessible the field of geographical economics to various audiences (Baldwin et al., 2003; Brakman et 
al., 2007; Combes et al., 2008). Whereas most old contributions to economic geography were often 
poorly related to mainstream economic theory, Krugman’s work has drawn space from the periphery 
to the center stage of economic theory, making new and already existing ideas more amenable to both 
theoretical and empirical scrutiny. While new economic geography is closely related to trade theory, it 
is also very much connected to industrial organization. It is, therefore, not totally surprising that the 
surge of new economic geography took place a few years after the revival of monopolistic competition 
and industrial organization, from which it borrows many ideas and concepts. There are also strong 
links to new growth theories, where many scholars see cities as the engine of growth. Thus, it is fair to 
say that new economic geography has contributed to the development of a new and large flow of high-
quality research and to the gradual emergence of a unified field. All of this highlights the integrative 




Abdel-Rahman, H. and A. Anas (2004) Theories of systems of cities, in J.V. Henderson and J.-F. 
Thisse (eds.) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Cities and Geography, Amsterdam: North 
Holland, pp. 2293-2342. 
Allais, M. (1943), A la recherche d'une discipline économique. Reprinted as: Traité d'économie pure, 
Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1952.  
Alonso, W. (1964) Location and Land Use, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Anas, A. (1983) Discrete choice theory, information theory, and the multinomial logit and gravity 
models, Transportation Research B, 17, pp. 13-23. 
Arrow, K. and G. Debreu (1954) Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy, 
Econometrica, 22, pp. 265-290. 
Baldwin, R. E., R. Forslid, P. Martin, G. I. P. Ottaviano, and F. Robert-Nicoud (2003) Economic 
Geography and Public Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
                                                 
10 It should be clear from what we have seen that, apart from Thünen and Launhardt, very little remains from the German       
location theorists praised by Isard (1949). There is no common thread and apparent coherence across the various German 
location theorists, which would found a German school of location theory (Bröcker, 2010). As seen in this paper, it is fair to 
say that Martin Beckmann epitomizes the German tradition at its best. He has simultaneously built on the existing German 
literature  and  modern  economic  theory  to  develop  very  new  and  fruitful  ways  to  cope  with  the  issues  raised  by  his 
predecessors.   17 
Baldwin, R.E. and P. Martin (2004) Agglomeration and regional growth, in J.V. Henderson and J.-F. 
Thisse (eds.) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Cities and Geography, Amsterdam: North 
Holland, pp. 2671-2711.   
Beckmann, M.J. (1972a) Von Thünen revisited: a neoclassical land use model, Swedish Journal of 
Economics, 74, pp. 1-7. 
Beckmann, M.J. (1972b) Spatial Cournot oligopoly, Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science 
Association, 28, pp. 37-47. 
Beckmann,  M.J.  (1976)  Spatial  equilibrium  in  the  dispersed  city,  in  Y.Y P a p a g e o r g i o u  ( e d . ) .  
Mathematical Land Use Theory, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 117-125. 
Blaug, M. (1985) Economic Theory in Retrospect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brakman, S., J.H. Garretsen and C. van Marrewijk (2009) The New Introduction to Geographical 
Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Braudel, F. (1979), Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV
e-XVIII
e siècle. Le temps du 
monde. Paris: Armand Colin. English translation: Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century. The 
Perspective of the World, New York: Harper Collins (1985). 
Bröcker,  J.  (2010)  Is  there  a  German  school  of  location  theory  before  1945?  memo,  Christian-
Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. 
Cantillon,  R.  (1755)  Essai  sur  la n a t u r e  d u  c o m m e r c e  e n  g é n é r a l ,  London:  Fletcher.  English 
translation by H. Higgs. Reprinted in 1964. New York: A.M. Kelley.  
Carrothers G. (1956) A historical review of the gravity and potential concepts of human interaction, 
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 22, pp. 94-102. 
Christaller, W. (1933) Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland, Jena: Gustav Fischer Verlag. English 
translation: The Central Places of Southern Germany, Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall (1966).  
Combes, P.-P., T. Mayer and J.-F. Thisse (2008) Economic Geography. The Integration of Regions 
and Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Cournot, A. (1838) Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, Paris: 
Hachette. English translation: Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 
New York: Macmillan (1897). 
d'Aspremont C., J.J. Gabszewicz and J.F. Thisse (1979) On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition”. 
Econometrica, 47, pp. 1045-1050. 
de Palma, A., V. Ginsburg, Y.Y Papageorgiou and J.-F. Thisse (1985) The principle of minimum 
differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity, Econometrica, 53, pp. 767-781. 
Dixit,  A.K.  and  J.E.  Stiglitz  (1977)  Monopolistic  competition  and  optimum  product  diversity, 
American Economic Review, 67, pp. 297-308. 
Dos Santos Ferreira, R. and J.-F. Thisse (1996) Horizontal and vertical differentiation: the Launhardt 
model, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp. 485-506. 
Dunn, E.S. (1954) The equilibrium of land-use pattern in agriculture, Southern Economic Journal, 21, 
pp. 173-187. 
Duranton,  G.  and  D.  Puga  (2004)  Micro-foundations  of  urban  increasing  returns:  theory,  in  J.V. 
Henderson  and  J.-F.Thisse  (eds.)  Handbook  of  Regional  and  Urban  Economics.  Cities  and 
Geography, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 2063-2117. 
Durlauf, S.N. (2004) Neighborhood effects, in J.V. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse (eds.) Handbook of 
Regional and Urban Economics. Cities and Geography, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 2173-2242.  
Eaton, B.C. and R.G. Lipsey (1977) The introduction of space into the neoclassical model of value 
theory, in M. Artis and A. Nobay (eds.) Studies in Modern Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 
59-96. 
Eaton, B.C. and R.G. Lipsey (1997) On the Foundations of Monopolistic Competition and Economic 
Geography, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Fetter, F.A. (1924) The economic law of market area, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 34, pp. 520-
529.  
Fujita, M. (1988) A monopolistic competition model of spatial agglomeration: a differentiated product 
approach, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 18, pp. 87-124. 
Fujita,  M.  (1989)  Urban  Economic  Theory.  Land  Use  and  City  Size, C a m b r i d g e :  C a m b r i d g e  
University Press.   18 
Fujita, M. and P. Krugman (1995) When is the economy monocentric? von Thünen and Chamberlin 
unified, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 25, pp. 505-528. 
Fujita,  M.,  P.  Krugman  and  A.J.  Venables  (1999)  The  Spatial  Economy.  Cities,  Regions  and 
International Trade, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Fujita,  M.  and  J.-F.  Thisse  (2002)  Economics  of  Agglomeration.  Cities,  Industrial  Location  and 
Regional Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,   
Fujita, M. and J.-F. Thisse (2006) Globalization and the evolution of the supply chain: who gains and 
who loses? International Economic Review, 47, pp. 811-836. 
Gabszewicz,  J.  J.,  and  J.-F.  Thisse  (1986)  Spatial  competition  and  the  location  of  firms,  in:  J.J. 
Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse, M. Fujita and U. Schweizer. Location Theory, Chur: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, pp. 1-71.  
Garretseen, H. and R. Martin (2010) Rethinking (new) economic geography models: taking geography 
and history seriously, Spatial Economic Analysis, 5, pp. 127-160.  
Hamilton,  B.W.  (1980)  Indivisibilities  and  interplant  transportation  cost:  do  they  cause  market 
breakdown? Journal of Urban Economics, 7, pp. 31-41. 
Hansen, P., M. Labbé, D. Peeters, and J.-F. Thisse (1987) Facility location analysis, in: P. Hansen, M. 
Labbé, D. Peeters, J.-F. Thisse, and J.V. Henderson, Systems of Cities and Facility Location, Chur: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, pp. 1-70.  
Harris, C. (1954) The market as a factor in the localization of industry in the United States, Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers, 64, pp. 315-348. 
Heffley, D.R. (1972) The quadratic assignment problem: a note, Econometrica, 40, pp. 1155-1163.  
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT 
Press. 
Helpman, E. (1998) The size of regions, in D. Pines, E. Sadka and I. Zilcha (eds.) Topics in Public 
Economics. Theoretical and Applied Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33-54. 
Henderson, J.V. (1974) The sizes and types of cities, American Economic Review, 64, pp. 640-656.  
Henderson, J.V. (1988) Urban Development. Theory, Fact and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hotelling, H. (1929) Stability in competition, Economic Journal, 39, pp. 41-57. 
Isard, W. (1949) The general theory of location and space-economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
63, pp. 476-506. 
Isard, W. (1956) Location and Space-Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Isard, W. (2003) History of Regional Science and the Regional Science Association International, 
Berlin: Springer.  
Kaldor, N. (1935) Market imperfection and excess capacity, Economica, 2, pp. 35-50. 
Koopmans, T.C. (1957) Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Koopmans,  T.C.  and  M.J.  Beckmann  (1957)  Assignment  problems  and  the  location  of  economic 
activities, Econometrica, 25, pp. 1401-1414. 
Krugman, P. (1991a) Geography and Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Krugman, P. (1991b) Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 
pp. 483-499. 
Krugman, P. (1995) Development, Geography, and Economic Theory, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
Krugman, P. (1999) Was it all in Ohlin? Internet site: http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/ohlin.html.  
Krugman, P. and A. J. Venables (1995) Globalization and the inequality of nations, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 110, pp. 857-880. 
Launhardt, W. (1882) Die Bestimmung des zweckmäßigsten Standortes einer gewerblichen Anlage. 
Zeitschrift des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 26, pp. 109-116. 
Launhardt, W (1885) Mathematische Begründung der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. 
English translation: Mathematical Principles of Economics. Aldershot: Edward Elgar (1993).  
Laurent, J. (2005) Henry George’s Legacy in Economic Thought, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lösch, A. (1940) Die Räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft, Jena: Gustav Fischer. English translation: 
The Economics of Location, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press (1954).  
Mills, E.S. (1967) An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area,  American 
Economic Review, 57, pp. 197-210.   19 
Mills, E.S. (1972) Studies in the Structure of the Urban Economy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press. 
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: Duckworth. 
Neary, J.P. (2001) Of hype and hyperbolas: introducing the new economic geography, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 39, pp. 536-561. 
Ohlin, B. (1933) Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Revised version published in 1968. 
Ota, M. and M. Fujita (1993) Communication technologies and spatial organization of multi-unit firms 
in metropolitan areas, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 23, pp. 695-729. 
Papageorgiou, Y.Y., and J.-F. Thisse (1985) Agglomeration as spatial interdependence between firms 
and households, Journal of Economic Theory, 37, pp. 19-31. 
Predöhl, A. (1928) The theory of location in its relation to general economics, Journal of Political 
Economy, 36, pp. 371-390. 
Ponsard, C. (1983) History of Spatial Economic Theory, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Ogawa, H. and M. Fujita (1980) Equilibrium land use patterns in a non-monocentric city, Journal of 
Regional Science, 20, pp. 455-475.    
Salop, S.C. (1979) Monopolistic competition with an outside good, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, pp. 
141-156. 
Samuelson,  P.A.  (1952)  Spatial  price  equilibrium  and  linear  programming,  American  Economic 
Review, 42, pp. 283-303. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) The transfer problem and transport cost. II. Analysis of effects of trade 
impediments, Economic Journal, 64, pp. 264–89.  
Samuelson, P.A. (1983) Thünen at two hundred, Journal of Economic Literature, 21, pp. 1468-1488. 
Schelling, T. (1969) Models of segregation, American Economic Review, 59, pp. 400-493. 
Schelling, T. (1971) Dynamic models of segregation, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1, pp. 143-
186. 
Starrett, D. (1978) Market allocations of location choice in a model with free mobility, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 17, pp. 21-37.  
Tabuchi, T. (1998) Agglomeration and dispersion: a synthesis of Alonso and Krugman. Journal of 
Urban Economics, 44, pp. 333-351.  
Tabuchi, T. and J.-F. Thisse (2002) Taste heterogeneity, labor mobility and economic geography. 
Journal of Development Economics, 69, pp. 155-177. 
Takayama, T. and G.G. Judge (1971) Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation Models, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.  
von Thünen, J.H. (1826) Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalökonomie, 
Hamburg: Perthes. English translation: The Isolated State, Oxford: Pergammon Press (1966). 
Warsh, D. (2006) Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations, New York: Norton. 
Weber, A. (1909) Über den Standort der Industrien, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. English translation: The 
Theory of the Location of Industries, Chicago: Chicago University Press (1929). 
Wesolowsky, G.O. (1993) The Weber problem: history and procedures, Location Theory, 1, pp. 5-23. 
Wilson, A.G. (1967) A statistical theory of spatial distribution models, Transportation Research 1, pp. 
253-269.  Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2010/58.  Thomas BAUDIN. Family policies: what does the standard endogenous fertility model tell us? 
2010/59.  Nicolas GILLIS and François GLINEUR. Nonnegative factorization and the maximum edge 
biclique problem. 
2010/60.  Paul BELLEFLAMME and Martin PEITZ. Digital piracy: theory. 
2010/61.  Axel GAUTIER and Xavier WAUTHY. Competitively neutral universal service obligations. 
2010/62.  Thierry BRECHET, Julien THENIE, Thibaut ZEIMES and Stéphane ZUBER. The benefits of 
cooperation under uncertainty: the case of climate change. 
2010/63.  Marco DI SUMMA and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Mixing sets linked by bidirected paths. 
2010/64.  Kaz MIYAGIWA, Huasheng SONG and Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE. Innovation, antidumping 
and retaliation. 
2010/65.  Thierry BRECHET, Natali HRITONENKO and Yuri YATSENKO. Adaptation and mitigation 
in long-term climate policies. 
2010/66.  Marc FLEURBAEY, Marie-Louise LEROUX and Gregory PONTHIERE. Compensating the 
dead? Yes we can! 
2010/67.  Philippe CHEVALIER, Jean-Christophe VAN DEN SCHRIECK and Ying WEI. Measuring the 
variability in supply chains with the peakedness. 
2010/68.  Mathieu VAN VYVE. Fixed-charge transportation on a path: optimization, LP formulations 
and separation. 
2010/69.  Roland Iwan LUTTENS. Lower bounds rule! 
2010/70.  Fred SCHROYEN and Adekola OYENUGA. Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public 
service under risk of interruption. 
2010/71.  Carlotta BALESTRA, Thierry BRECHET and Stéphane LAMBRECHT. Property rights with 
biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade. 
2010/72.  Olivier GERGAUD and Victor GINSBURGH. Success: talent, intelligence or beauty? 
2010/73.  Jean GABSZEWICZ, Victor GINSBURGH, Didier LAUSSEL and Shlomo WEBER. Foreign 
languages' acquisition: self learning and linguistic schools. 
2010/74.  Cédric  CEULEMANS,  Victor  GINSBURGH  and  Patrick  LEGROS.  Rock  and  roll  bands, 
(in)complete contracts and creativity. 
2010/75.  Nicolas  GILLIS  and  François  GLINEUR.  Low-rank  matrix  approximation  with  weights  or 
missing data is NP-hard. 
2010/76.  Ana  MAULEON,  Vincent  VANNETELBOSCH  and  Cecilia  VERGARI.  Unions'  relative 
concerns and strikes in wage bargaining. 
2010/77.  Ana MAULEON, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH and Cecilia VERGARI. Bargaining and delay 
in patent licensing. 
2010/78.  Jean J. GABSZEWICZ and Ornella TAROLA. Product innovation and market acquisition of 
firms. 
2010/79.  Michel  LE  BRETON,  Juan  D.  MORENO-TERNERO,  Alexei  SAVVATEEV  and  Shlomo 
WEBER. Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership. 
2010/80.  Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO. Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods. 
2010/81.  Jean  HINDRIKS,  Marijn  VERSCHELDE,  Glenn  RAYP  and  Koen  SCHOORS.  School 
tracking, social segregation and educational opportunity: evidence from Belgium. 
2010/82.  Jean  HINDRIKS,  Marijn  VERSCHELDE,  Glenn  RAYP  and  Koen  SCHOORS.  School 
autonomy and educational performance: within-country evidence. 
2010/83.  Dunia LOPEZ-PINTADO. Influence networks. 
2010/84.  Per AGRELL and Axel GAUTIER. A theory of soft capture. 
2010/85.  Per AGRELL and Roman KASPERZEC. Dynamic joint investments in supply chains under 
information asymmetry. 
2010/86.  Thierry BRECHET and Pierre M. PICARD. The economics of airport noise: how to manage 
markets for noise licenses. 
2010/87.  Eve RAMAEKERS. Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents. 
2011/1.  Yu. NESTEROV. Random gradient-free minimization of convex functions. Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2011/2.  Olivier  DEVOLDER,  François  GLINEUR  and  Yu.  NESTEROV.  First-order  methods  of 
smooth convex optimization with inexact oracle. 
2011/3.  Luc  BAUWENS,  Gary  KOOP,  Dimitris  KOROBILIS  and  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS. A  
comparison of forecasting procedures for macroeconomic series: the contribution of structural 
break models. 
2011/4.  Taoufik  BOUEZMARNI  and  Sébastien  VAN  BELLEGEM.  Nonparametric  Beta  kernel 
estimator for long memory time series. 
2011/5.  Filippo L. CALCIANO. The complementarity foundations of industrial organization. 
2011/6.  Vincent BODART, Bertrand CANDELON and Jean-François CARPANTIER. Real exchanges 
rates in commodity producing countries: a reappraisal. 
2011/7.  Georg  KIRCHSTEIGER,  Marco  MANTOVANI,  Ana  MAULEON  and  Vincent 
VANNETELBOSCH. Myopic or farsighted? An experiment on network formation. 
2011/8.  Florian MAYNERIS and Sandra PONCET. Export performance of Chinese domestic firms: the 
role of foreign export spillovers. 
2011/9.  Hiroshi UNO. Nested potentials and robust equilibria. 
2011/10.  Evgeny  ZHELOBODKO,  Sergey  KOKOVIN,  Mathieu  PARENTI  and  Jacques-François 
THISSE. Monopolistic competition in general equilibrium: beyond the CES. 
2011/11.  Luc BAUWENS, Christian HAFNER and Diane PIERRET. Multivariate volatility modeling of 
electricity futures. 




J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and J -F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
P. BELLEFLAMME and M. PEITZ (eds) (2010), Industrial organization: markets and strategies. Cambridge 
University Press. 
M. JUNGER, Th. LIEBLING, D. NADDEF, G. NEMHAUSER, W. PULLEYBLANK, G. REINELT, G. 
RINALDI and L. WOLSEY (eds) (2010), 50 years of integer programming, 1958-2008: from 
the early years to the state-of-the-art. Berlin Springer. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 